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IR Reform: Choice and Compulsion
Introduction
Justice Henry Higgins, the architect of the 1907 Harvester Decision of the 
Arbitration Court which enshrined the principle of a living wage, defined the 
scope of the Australian arbitration system as a “new province for law and order”. 
Almost  a  century  on,  John  Howard  claims  that  industrial  relations  reform 
package WorkChoices is “one of the great pieces of unfinished business in the 
structural transformation of the Australian economy”. 
Howard’s reforms are often seen as representing a reversal of the choices 
made at the time of Federation, and in important respects this is true. The role 
of the AIRC, successor to the Arbitration Court has been greatly diminished, and 
the task of determining minimum wages has been handed to a new body, the 
Fair Pay commission. A central aim of the legislation is to eliminate collective 
bargaining, mediated by arbitration, in favour of directly-negotiated individual 
contracts.
In other respects, however, there is an important element of continuity. 
Far from abandoning the idea that industrial relations is an appropriate sphere 
for ‘law and order’, the Howard government has created a detailed system of 
regulation and State intervention, more intrusive, in many respects than the one 
it is replacing. WorkChoices and the associated reforms create a wide range of 
criminal offences, civil wrongs and prohibitions on various kinds of industrial 
action
This point was made by a number of commentators when the legislation 
was being debated. However, since the regulations implementing the program 
were  released  on  …,  and  WorkChoices  came  into  effect  on  …,  previously 
unobserved features of the package have become apparent. In particular, while 
the legislation is designed to shift the balance of workplace power in favour of 
employers, it does so, in large measure by imposing constraints on individual 
employers, preventing them from reaching agreements seen by the government 
as contrary to the interests of employers in general. This is consistent with the 2
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pressure applied by the government to its own departments, and to enterprises 
that deal with governments, such as universities and construction companies, to 
adopt its preferred model, rather than choose freely from the legally available 
options.
The paper begins with a schematic survey of the historical background, 
which  provides  the  context  for  the  changes  embodied  in  WorkChoices,  briefly 
described in Section 2. The core of the paper, Section 3, examines the role of 
choice and constraint in the design of the reforms. This analysis is used to inform 
an assessment of the likely implications of reform for wages and conditions, and 
likely  effects  on  inequality.  A  similar  analysis  is  applied  to  assess  effects  on 
growth,  productivity,  employment  and  unemployment.  Finally,  we  consider 
possible future directions for alternative reform strategies.
1. Historical background
The  great  strikes  of  the  1890s  demonstrated  that  a  labour  relations 
regime based on the law of master and servant was untenable as a matter of 
justice. Federation saw the entrenchment of Commonwealth powers to establish 
institutions to conciliate and arbitrate industrial disputes across state borders. 
State  governments  followed  suit  with  their  own  dispute  settling  and  wage-
fixation tribunals. 
Distinctive  about  the  Australian  arbitral  model  was  its  recognition  of 
unions as bargaining parties with legal rights, and wage-fixation on national and 
industry  levels  through  awards.  Awards  also  comprehensively  stipulated 
employment  conditions.  The  central  theme  was  the  idea  of  the  State  as  an 
impartial arbiter between two parties, capital and labour, both with legitimate 
claims to a share of income. The arbitral model struck different balances over 
time  between  equity  and  economic  efficiency,  but  was  sufficiently  flexible  to 
maintain its standing as part of a public policy consensus. 
The combination of Arbitration, tariff protection and the White Australia 
policy has commonly been referred to as the ‘Australian settlement’ (Kelly 1992,   
see  also  Henderson  1983).  However,  this  set  of  policies  proved  inadequate  to 3
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manage the economic shocks of the 1920s and the Great Depression, and a new 
settlement  emerged  during  and  after  World  War  II.  In  this  new  system, 
Keynesian  macroeconomic  management  played  a  central  role,  and  the  White 
Australia Policy was phased out over several decades, ending with the election of 
the Whitlam government in 1972 (Smyth 1998). 
Both macroeconomic management and the arbitral system were highly 
successful  between  1945  and  1970,  The  system  delivered  high  wages  and 
employment security, and was supported by both the ALP and the Liberal Party 
and in general by employers (Macintyre & Mitchell 1989).
The political and economic legitimacy of the arbitral model rested on not 
only  a  broad  consensus  among  the  parties  but  also  on  a  particular  view  of 
Australia’s place in the international political economy which was in substance 
little changed from Federation through to the stagflation crisis of the 1970s. The 
view that the arbitral model was an integral part of the Australian settlement 
captures nicely its relationship with protectionism, and a largely primary export 
driven  economy.  With  full  employment  and  steady  growth  apparently 
guaranteed by Keynesian demand management, the arbitral system could focus 
on the equitable division of the benefits of prosperity.
Dissent  from  the  dominant  consensus  emerged  as  early  as  the  1970s, 
though  the  focus  was  initially  on  criticism  of  tariff  protection.  Economic 
turbulence in the 1970s, and a shift in the labour share of GDP and increased 
bargaining  power  by  unionised  workers  led  to  a  backlash.  The  Fraser 
government  attempted  to  reduce  the  real  wage  ‘overhang’  by  increasing  the 
power  of  the  Arbitration  Commission,  and  later  through  a  wage-price  freeze. 
Increasingly,  however,  there  was  pressure  from  neoliberal  economists  (then 
commonly referred as ‘economic rationalists’) to abandon the arbitral model in 
favour of a ‘deregulated’ labour market (Kasper et al. 1980) 
The Accord
The  Labor  party,  however,  moved  in  the  opposite  direction,  seeking  a 
consensus-based resolution of disputes over the division of national income. The 4
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leading  advocate  of  this  view,  was  then  Australian  Council  of  Trade  Unions 
(ACTU) leader Bob Hawke, who subsequently led Labor to victory in the 1983 
election.  Although  Hawke  envisaged  a  tripartite  arrangement  involving 
government, unions and employer bodies, attempts to involve business in such 
agreements  yielded  little  success.  What  emerged  instead  was  the  Prices  and 
Incomes Accord  negotiated between the government and the ACTU in 1983.
For much of the 1980s, increases in wages arose primarily from annual 
national  wage  cases,  in  which  the  crucial  determinant  of  the  outcome  was 
bargaining  between  the  ACTU  and  the  Hawke  Labor  government  under 
successive versions of the Accord. This actually represented a re-centralisation of 
wage determination, and was in many ways a response to perceived and actual 
“wage  breakouts”  through  over-award  collective  bargaining  in  the  1970s  and 
during the resource boom of the early 1980s (Dabscheck 1995). 
The avowed aim of the Hawke-Keating governments was to adjust the 
Australian  Settlement  model  to  a  globalising  economy  where  flexibility  and 
productivity  were  seen  as  key  drivers  of  successful  international 
competitiveness.  However,  the  “managed  decentralism”  characteristic  of  the 
Accord process sought to do this while maintaining consensus among the parties, 
and to do so while encouraging productivity rather than wage advantages for 
firms, and for the economy generally (Gruen and Grattan 1993).
Although there is a voluminous literature on the Accord (Bahnisch 2001), 
for present purposes, the key features of the model can be taken to be a high 
degree of centralisation and a key role for the ACTU, reform and modernisation 
of awards, and a generally peaceful industrial climate reflecting the corporatist 
policy settings at the peak level.
Despite the success of the Accord, centralised wage fixation was subject to 
increasingly  severe  criticism  during  the  1980s.  The  foundation  of  the  HR 
Nicholls  society  in  1986  was  a  notable  example.  Demands  for  the  removal  of 
‘restrictive  work  practices’  and  reassertions  of  the  Australian  shibboleth  of 
“management prerogative” became increasingly strident as the 1980s wore on, 
being incorporated into a distinctly neo-liberal set of policy prescriptions which 5
6
7
reached  their  apogee  with  John  Hewson’s  Fightback   in  1993  (Hewson  and 
Fischer  1991,  1992).  In  many  ways,  the  ideology  embodied  in  Fightback   had 
resonances with international moves towards decentralisation and deregulation 
in employment relations, particularly in the UK, US, and New Zealand, but in a 
particularly Australian context, its extreme legalism has translated through into 
WorkChoices. 
Enterprise bargaining
As  the  Accord  process  came  under  strain  in  the  late  1980s,  individual 
unions  sought  to  regain  a  more  prominent  role  in  wage  bargaining,  while 
policymakers sought to increase flexibility. Initially manifested through limited 
productivity bargaining still within the framework of the National Wage Case in 
1987 and 1988, the outcome in 1991 was the system of enterprise bargaining, in 
which  unions  reached  agreements  with  individual  employers,  and  the  award 
system was effectively reduced to a safety net, with diminished capacity by both 
the  AIRC  and  the  parties  at  peak  level  to  directly  influence  wage  outcomes.   
Reflecting  the  political  compromise  that  led  to  the  adoption  of  enterprise 
bargaining, unions focused on the bargaining aspect, while employers focused on 
flexibility and the opportunity to buy out restrictive award conditions. 
The  take  up  of  enterprise  bargaining  subsequent  to  the  second  AIRC 
National  Wage  Case  decision  in  1991,  and  more  importantly  the  Keating 
government’s 1993 legislation, was still driven by the parties to the Accord – 
particularly  the  government  and  the  ACTU  –  and  the  wave  of  union 
amalgamations which represented the ACTU’s strategic direction ensured that 
pattern bargaining was the rule rather than the exception.
The Howard government 
Shortly after its election in 1996, the Howard government introduced the 
Workplace  Relations  Act.  Despite  having  its  sails  trimmed  to  fit  prevailing 
electoral winds and the necessity of passing the Senate, the Workplace Relations 
Act produced a significant shift in the balance of power in the workplace. The 
Howard Government swept   away much social regulation of the labour market 6
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and  of  working  conditions,  while  enhancing  the  power  the  government  and 
employers have to internally regulate employment and working life. 
Although  the  rhetoric  of  both  the  Howard  government’s  pre-election 
policy  and  that  surrounding  the  introduction  of  the  Workplace  Relations  Act 
claimed  that  flexibility  and  choice  were  key  themes,  to  be  achieved  by 
eliminating  “third  parties”  (for  which,  read  the  AIRC  and  unions)  from  co-
operative workplace relations, the reality was that the choices which led to the 
increased  individualisation  of  wage  determination  were  largely  those  of 
employers who were inclined to strategies of deunionisation. 
The  path  was  blazed,  as  a  way  of  setting  an  example  to  recalcitrant 
businesses,  by  the  Federal  government  itself.  Thus  the  ideologues  of 
individualised employment relations showed that they were concerned to ensure 
that individual actors in the system – businesses among them – hewed closely to 
a  line  set  by  the  big  players,  the  Business  Council  of  Australia  and  the 
Government itself.
Significant  barriers  were  placed  in  the  way  of  employees,  and  even 
pluralist  employers  seeking  to  foster  employee  voice  through  union 
representation, while the vestiges of compulsory unionism were swept away. The 
“simplification”  of  awards  to  20  allowable  matters  foregrounded  managerial 
choice in many aspects of working life and the determination of conditions, and 
heightened existing trends to casualisation and contracting out of work. 
In many respects the Workplace Relations Act met the major concerns of 
employers.  Union  density  declined  sharply,  despite  generally  favourable 
economic  conditions.  There  was  a  significant  increase  in  the  flexibility  of 
employment arrangements available to employers, achieved in large measure by 
reducing  the  flexibility  available  to  workers.  Work  intensity  and  the  working 
hours of full-time employees increased substantially.
Nevertheless, some counter trends under the Workplace Relations Act led 
to regular calls from both business lobbies and from within government for a 
“second wave” of reforms, calls which could find their answer in the unexpected 
accession  of  a  Senate  majority  to  the  Howard  government  in  2004.  The 7
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Australian  Industrial  Relations  Commission  proved  more  interventionist  than 
anticipated, continuing to set new employment standards through test cases (for 
instance,  redundancy  payments  in  small  businesses  which  the  government  is 
keen  to  wind  back).  Penetration  of  AWAs  was  much  lower  than  anticipated, 
being concentrated within government and mining and telecommunications, and 
to a lesser degree service industries.
It is not surprising then, that the achievement of a Senate majority led to 
the  introduction  of  radical  new  measures,  packaged  as  WorkChoices.  We  now 
turn to an analysis of these changes.
2. Key provisions of Workchoices
The WorkChoices legislation (get actual name of Act) has been discussed 
in  some  detail  (refs.  In  this  section,  we  focus  primarily  on  the  regulations 
implementing WorkChoices, and on aspects of the legislation that enhance the 
power  of  the  Commonwealth  government  and  the  Minister  for  Industrial 
Relations at the expense of State governments, workers and unions and, in some 
cases, employers.
The Fair Pay Commission
Under WorkChoices, responsibility for setting minimum wages is taken 
away from the Australian Industrial Relations Commissions, and given to a new 
body, the Fair Pay Commission, modelled on the British Low Pay Commission, 
which will set a statutory Federal Minimum Wage.
Although  it  remains  to  be  seen  how  the  Fair  Pay  Commission  will 
determine  minimum  wages,  the  expectation  is  that  minimum  wages  will  be 
reduced in real value or, at least, that they will decline relative to median wages 
over time.
Contracts and awards
Minimum conditions will be set by legislation rather than through the 
awards process. Both enterprise bargaining agreements (EBAs) and Australian 
Workplace  Agreements  (AWAs)  will  be  assessed  by  the  OEA  and  both  will 8
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require substantially less scrutiny. Most significantly, the reframing of the no 
disadvantage  test  will  allow  AWAs  to  undercut  award  minima,  effectively 
making the award protections optional for employers. 
Although the advertising campaign mounted at the time legislation was 
passed stressed that a wide range of conditions, including public holidays were 
‘Protected by Law’, these protections have little substance. They do not apply at 
all to new employees, who may be offered contracts requiring work on public 
holidays. The weakening of the no disadvantage test means that such protections 
can be stripped away more easily during the process of negotiating new EBAs 
and AWAs.
Abolition of state tribunals
The  Commonwealth  government  does  not  have  constitutional  power  to 
legislate for the determination of wages and working conditions generally, only 
to provide a mechanism for the settlement of inter-state industrial disputes. The 
Hawke and Keating governments expanded the reach of the Commonwealth into 
the workplace, with a number of legislative provisions resting on the external 
affairs  power  (justified  by  the  adherence  of  Australia  to  ILO  conventions).  In 
part, this reflected a desire to entrench equal rights for women and other groups 
in the workplace through anti-discrimination and other equity legislation, but it 
also represented the frustration of the government and the ACTU with the AIRC 
over its tardiness in accepting enterprise bargaining. The little used provisions 
for non-union certified agreements which formed part of the Keating legislation 
rested on the corporations power. 
By  contrast,  state  jurisdiction  over  employment  relations  is  in  theory 
unrestricted – as state constitutions empower parliaments to make legislation 
for the “peace, good order and good government” of the state in question. Victoria 
handed  its  industrial  powers  to  the  Commonwealth  under  the  Kennett 
government,  but  other  state  jurisdictions  remain  robust  in  their  coverage  of 
workers – particularly those in Queensland and New South Wales. 
The WorkChoices legislation seeks to abolish state tribunals altogether. 9
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As with the Hawke-Keating government, the extension of Commonwealth power 
relies on the  corporations power. The validity of this application remains to be 
tested, as does the workability of the system in relation to employers other than 
corporations.
Prohibited terms in contract
There  are  a  number  of  terms  which  cannot  be  inserted  into  an 
employment contract, whether at the instance of the employer or the employee 
(and indeed, the Act makes it a criminal offence with substantial penalties for 
such terms to be put on the table). It is currently unclear how far this constraint 
on agreement making will extend, as the Minister is at the time of writing yet to 
table Regulations made under the Act. However, it is open to the Minister to 
include potentially any condition as a ‘prohibited term’ by regulation. 
Most important at this stage is the prohibition on inserting provisions 
relating  to  unfair  dismissal  in  contracts.  Many  common  law  contracts  –  for 
example,  those  for  senior  corporate  executives  and  professionals  such  as  the 
partners  of  legal  firms  –  include  such  provisions.  In  the  United  States,  it  is 
common for employment contracts to nominate an external third party arbitrator 
to resolve disputes. The intent of this prohibition appears to be to prevent unions 
from entrenching the abolished protections against unfair dismissal (which are 
effectively absolutely abolished – given the provision that operational reasons 
override  them  where  they  still  exist  in  organisations  with  more  than  100 
employees) in certified agreements. 
Limits on strikes and lockouts
Strikes  have  been  legal  during  bargaining  periods  since  the  Keating 
legislation,  but  compared  to  other  countries,  were  already  severely 
circumscribed. For instance, disputes during the term of an agreement over its 
interpretation could not legally use a strike as a tactic. 
The  Workplace  Relations  Act   1996  further  circumscribed  the  range  of 
allowable industrial tactics, and as in WorkChoices, one of the few areas where 
the AIRC was given enhanced powers was in punitive rulings against industrial 10
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action. There was much discussion in business circles over the ensuing decade 
about the unwillingness of many employers to make use of the harsh penalties 
available, which is understandable, as it is usually in the interest of an employer 
to maintain or restore good relations with its bargaining partners. Consequently, 
WorkChoices  takes  the  choice  out  of  the  employer’s  hands  by  allowing  the 
Minister  to  make  application  to  the  AIRC  by  declaring  that  strike  action  is 
“adversely affecting” an employer. Aggrieved “third parties” can also take such 
action  (for  instance,  customers  or  suppliers).  Other  interventions  include  the 
introduction of secret ballots for strikes 
By contrast, the removal of no-disadvantage tests greatly increases the 
range of demands employers may legally use as the basis for a lockout. In effect, 
employers have an almost absolute right to lock out their workers
Discretionary power of minister
WorkChoices  confers  a  wide  range  of  discretionary  powers  on  the 
Minister,  most  notably  in  relation  to  ‘essential  services’.  These  are  defined 
broadly to include any activity where industrial action might cause significant 
damage to the economy. The Minister can issue Directions to lessen the threat to 
essential services, including:
* terminating all relevant bargaining periods;
* requiring employees to lift work bans or return to work; and
* requiring the employer to allow employees back onto the worksite in the 
case of a lockout.
In practice, it seems clear that the power will be used primarily against 
employees, as has been the case with similar powers in the past.
3. Choice and Constraint in WorkChoices
From the beginning, the arbitral approach has been subject to two kinds 
of criticism. The first was that the State should not be involved in the operations 
of  labour  markets,  which  should  be  left  to  free  contract  between  individual 
workers  and  employers.  As  has  become  clear,  however,  the  relations  between 
workers  and  employers  are  so  complex  that  any  attempt  to  apply  standard 11
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contractual  law  is  doomed  to  failure.  In  effect,  the  interpretation  of  labour 
contracts  inevitably  involves  intervention.  As  Buchanan  and  Callus  (1993) 
observe, deregulation is a furphy in the Australian employment relations debate, 
the  real  choice  being  between  external  or  social  regulation  and  internal  or 
managerial regulation.
The other big problem with this approach relates to the role of unions. 
The argument would appear to imply that unions should be unregulated, except 
perhaps  for  restrictions  on  violent  picketing  and  similar  activities  involving 
actual or threatened use of force. However, most advocates of deregulation seek 
to preserve a wide range of tort actions ultimately derived not from contract law 
but from feudal concepts of master-servant relationships. 
The second kind of criticism applied to the idea of neutrality. Advocates of 
both capital and labour have, at different times, argued that the arbitral system 
was biased against them and that reform was needed to restore the balance, for 
example  by  prohibiting  ‘unfair’  actions  by  the  other  side,  and  by  removing 
restrictions  on  their  own  activities.  So,  for  example,  unions  have  sought 
protection against lockouts and strikebreaking, while employers have sought the 
prohibition of secondary boycotts, ‘wildcat’ strikes and so on. 
The WorkChoices legislation is, in large measure, motivated by the desire 
to tilt the balance in favour of employers and ensure that employment bargains 
produce outcomes that increase the power of employers and managers as a class. 
The  purpose  of  the  legislation  is  not  deregulation  but  the  use  of  centralised 
power  to  impose  the  kinds  of  labour  market  relationships  favoured  by  the 
government and the business sector. 
Importantly, just as unions have historically sought to prevent employers 
bargaining  separately  with  non-union  workers  and  therefore  reducing  the 
bargaining power of workers as a group, the WorkChoices package imposes a 
wide range of restrictions on employers who might wish to bargain with workers 
or unions on terms the government considers inappropriate. It is, in part, for this 
reason  that  labour  economists  supportive  of  deregulation,  such  as  Wooden 




The  general  pattern  of  government  intervention  designed  to  restrict 
action by employees, and tilt the balance in favour of employers has been evident 
ever since the election of the Howard government. The Workplace Relations Act 
and  subsequent  amending  legislation  and  regulations  which  enabled  the 
Minister to intervene and bring actions before the AIRC and the Courts. The 
Commonwealth, and the NFF, also explicitly saw the Waterfront Dispute of 1998 
as  modelling  and  exemplifying  the  preferred  strategy  of  deunionisation. 
Similarly,  the  exceptional  powers  granted  to  Commonwealth  agencies  in  the 
building  and  construction  industry  represented  a  fear,  that  all  things  being 
equal,  pattern  bargaining  and  effective  unionisation  would  be  accepted  by 
employers as a business reality. It is not insignificant that two sectors of prime 
economic importance during the Howard years, mining and construction, were 
targets of business and government concern respectively. 
The  truth  of  the  choices  involved  for  individuals,  meanwhile,  can  be 
demonstrated  by  the  Commonwealth’s  effective  departure  from  award 
enforcement  (and  regular  attempts  to  make  union  access  more  difficult  thus 
placing the responsibility for action squarely back on individual employees) and 
the  one-sidedness  of  the  Office  of  the  Employment  Advocate’s  enforcement  of 
freedom of association provisions contained in the Act. The theme of constraint of 
employees and unions and choice on the part of employers and management is a 
much  more  useful  analytical  lens  through  which  to  view  the  Howard  era  of 
employment relations, as WorkChoices amply demonstrates.
Centralisation of power
One important element of flexibility in the Australian arbitral system has 
been  provided  by  the  existence  of  state  and  Commonwealth  tribunals  with 
potentially overlapping, and therefore competitive, jurisdictions. WorkChoices is 
designed to eliminate this source of competition.
Arguments  in  favour  of  the  abolition  of  the  state  system  have  been 
premised on the alleged inefficiency of overlapping jurisdictions. There is some 13
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merit in this argument, though it can be countered. First, it is relatively simple 
for many employers (and unions) to choose the jurisdiction in which they operate 
–  Coles  for  instance,  though  operating  Australia  wide,  operates  under  state 
awards  in  order  to  capture  the  benefits  of  lower  wages  outside  NSW  and 
Victoria. Secondly, the excessive legalism and regulatory proscription involved in 
WorkChoices hardly provides a solution to inefficiency and excessive complexity.   
Most importantly, arguments for uniformity fail to take account of the benefits of 
diversity in allowing competing models to be tested.
As Baird, Ellem & Wright (2005) observe, the Liberal states, to greater 
and  lesser  degree,  were  the  path  breakers  for  individualisation  of  the 
employment  relationship  in  the  1990s.  Since  the  election  of  the  NSW  Labor 
government in 1995 (and the consequent election of Labor governments in every 
state  and  territory  subsequently),  a  number  of  policy  innovations  have  been 
enshrined  in  state  legislation,  particularly  in  the  important  area  of  gender 
equity, where experience in one jurisdiction has enabled further refinement of 
models which are both concerned with fairness and tailored to modern workplace 
conditions (Bahnisch 2000). 
One constitutional advantage of state jurisdictions is the ability to set 
minimum working conditions (for instance leave entitlements) for all employees, 
including those who are outside the award system on common law contracts, and 
to regulate employer moves to contract labour where the intent is not to employ 
a genuine contractor but place the responsibility for all conditions other than 
remuneration and some on costs back on the worker. Typically, federalism has 
been  defended  as  a  contributor  to  good  public  policy  through  the  ability  to 
innovate in different jurisdictions. 
State  tribunals  are  also  able  to  consider  differing  employment  and 
productivity trends, and are often more accessible to the parties than the AIRC. 
For instance, the Queensland Commission privileges conciliation, and proceeds 
in a much less legalistic fashion than the AIRC, which is one of the complaints 




The  limits  of  the  Corporations  power  remain  untested,  and  will  be 
adjudicated on by the High Court in May 2006. Regardless of the outcome, it is 
evident that WorkChoices does not deliver choice in this area.
Ministerial power
As  noted  above,  the  changes  enhance  the  power  of  the  Federal 
government, through the Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations, to 
intervene directly in the setting of wages and conditions. A range of prescriptive 
and  punitive  powers  are  given  to  the  Minister  acting  either  under  extensive 
personal powers in relation to ‘essential services’ or through the AIRC in relation 
to routine strike action.
Clearly,  one  major  objective  of  these  powers  is  to  ensure  that  normal 
labour  market  bargaining  practices  should  not  apply  in  sectors  regarded  by 
government as strategic, or where, as a result of the time-sensitivity of work or 
the capital-intensity of the industry, the bargaining power of unions is above 
average. Previous interventions in the building and waterfront industries set the 
pattern here.
Another major concern of the government is the desire to prevent ‘pattern 
bargaining’, in which unions seek to negotiate the same set of outcomes with 
different  employers.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  no  restriction  on  individual 
employers  offering  a  common  contract  to  all  their  employees,  and,  it  would 
appear,  nothing  to  stop  groups  of  employers  agreeing  on  standard  terms  for 
AWAs and similar contracts.
The government’s objections on this score might seem surprising, since a 
competitive labour market would normally be expected to produce precisely the 
same  result  as  pattern  bargaining.  However,  bargaining  theory  produces  a 
simple explanation. In a bargaining relations, the ability of a party to determine 
a salient point relative to which agreement is reached can confer a substantial 
strategic advantage. Pattern bargaining enables unions to set the salient point. 





Workchoices incorporates a wide range of prohibitions on the inclusion of 
various  kinds  of  terms  in  agreements.  Such  prohibitions  are  not  new  in 
themselves: existing law prohibits various kinds of terms seen as likely to create 
unsafe  working  conditions,  for  example.  However,  virtually  all  the  new 
prohibitions refer to terms favoured by unions and disliked by employer groups. 
The  most  striking  example  is  that  it  is  impossible  to  negotiate  guarantees 
against unfair dismissal.
Many larger employers – public or private sector – will wish to maintain 
formalised procedures for discipline and dismissal as a matter of good human 
resource practice, but these will no longer be legally enforceable. The absurdity 
of  claiming  that  legislation  protects  choice  and  freedom  of  bargaining  and 
association is clearly revealed when the Government can arbitrarily stipulate the 
scope of bargaining.
  At  the  outset  of  the  policy  process  leading  to  the  introduction  of 
WorkChoices, when the Liberal Party’s IR policy was released in the lead up to 
the 1996 election, much was made of the need for employees and employers to 
bargain absent of the constraint of third parties. This theme has been revived in 
the  selling  of  WorkChoices,  with  the  impression  given  that  employers  and 
employees  will  achieve  mutual  accommodation  and  foster  productivity  and 
flexibility through agreement making. In fact, though, it is the Commonwealth 
government  which  is  now  the  most  powerful  third  party  intervening  between 
employers and employees to reduce their scope for choice. 
Asymmetry of treatment of strikes and lockouts
For most of the 20th century, in Australia and other countries, strikes 
and lockouts were regarded asymmetrically, although the formal statement of 
the law was largely symmetrical. Strikes were common and, provided standard 
rules  were  followed,  legitimate  parts  of  the  bargaining  process  by  which 
employees sought to share in the benefits of economic growth. Lockouts were 




The  balance  shifted  in  the  late  20th  century  as  lockouts  became  more 
common  and  employers  increasingly  sought  to  rescind  benefits  that  had 
previously  been  gained  by  workers.  However,  the  general  pattern  of  legal 
symmetry was maintained.
WorkChoices produces a situation, not seen since the 19th century, in 
which lockouts are almost completely unrestricted, while strikes are subject to a 
wide  range  of  constraints.  These  include  common  law  penalties  derived 
ultimately from the law of master and servant, restrictions on secondary boycotts 
under common law, enhanced penal powers for the AIRC (otherwise rendered 
largely ineffectual) and the option of direct ministerial intervention.
As the submission by A Group of 151  Academics (2005) states:
Other  OECD  nations  either  prohibit  lockouts  or 
limit  them  to  exceptional  circumstances  in  which 
employers are considered to suffer from an imbalance of 
bargaining  power.    Typically,  other  OECD  nations  only 
permit ‘defensive’ lockouts in collective bargaining, which 
respond to strikes.  If employers have too ready access to 
lockouts, lockouts can compromise the right to freedom of 
association, collective bargaining and to strike. Whereas 
other  OECD  nations  limit  employer  access  to  lockouts 
relative  to  strikes  to  try  and  maintain  bargaining 
equilibrium  and  fair  agreement-making,  the   Bill   will 
make  the  use  of  strikes  more  difficult,  expensive  and 
inflexible, relative to lockouts.
Summary
Any  attempt  to  analyse  WorkChoices  in  terms  of  deregulation  is 
untenable. The only way in which the legislation can be understood is in terms of 
a systematic reorientation of intervention away from the notion of the state as a 
neutral arbiter, and a return to the position of the early 19th century, where the 
state  intervened  in  defence  of  the  rights  of  masters  against  the  claims  of 
servants.
4. Implications for wages and conditions17
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Employment  relationships  are  complex,  but  the  outcome  of  bargaining 
depends on two factors. The first is the state of the labour market. The second is 
the  balance  of  bargaining  power.  Although,  the  state  of  the  labour  market  is 
more  important,  it  is  largely  determined  by  exogenous  macroeconomic  shocks 
originating  not  in  the  labour  market  but  in  the  financial  sector  or  the  world 
economy. 
The reforms proposed by the Howard Government will tilt the balance 
further in favour of employers. It seems likely therefore, that wage bargains will 
reflect the preferences of employers.
Observation of employer proposals in enterprise bargaining, and of the 
terms of AWAs suggest that employers place a high premium on ‘the right to 
manage’.  Employer offers in enterprise bargaining typically included increases 
in real or at least nominal wages, offset by trade-offs involving the removal a 
range of conditions (stigmatised by employers as ‘restrictive trade practices’).
The most common single employer demand has been the replacement of 
wage contracts based on standard hours of employment and overtime payments 
for  extra  work  by  annual  salaries  in  which  overtime  was  unpaid  or,  at  best, 
compensated by ‘time off in lieu’ allowed at a time of the employer’s choosing.   
More generally, employers have sought to remove restrictions of all kinds on the 
organisation  of  work.  Employer  claims  are  summarised  in  the  Agreements 
Database and Monitor (ADAM) Reports produced by ACIRRT (various dates).
The  ability  to  direct  employees  to  work  at  any  time,  and  without 
restrictions  on  the  way  in  which  work  is  performed.  has  obvious  economic 
benefits  to  employers,  which  would  explain  a  willingness  to  pay  a  wage 
premium.  However,  it  is  also  important  to  consider  social,  psychological  and 
cultural issues. 
Most private employers work hard and work long hours, and enjoy doing 
so.  Many  consider  that  their  employees  should  display  the  same  attitude, 
without considering the fact that their jobs are typically less well-paid and less 
interesting than those of employers. 
Less benignly, ‘flexible’ working conditions increase the personal power of 18
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employers  over  employees,  and  the  desire  for  power  over  others  is  a  strong 
motive for human behaviour of many kinds. Conversely, resistance to such power 
has been one reason why workers have sought to establish unions and impose 
restrictions on work practices.
The outcomes of the shift towards enterprise bargaining that began in the 
early 1990s were consistent with this prediction. Average hours of work for full-
time employees increased and there was a great deal of anecdotal evidence to 
suggest  that  the  pace  and  intensity  of  work  increased.  Between  1993-94  and 
1998-99 there was strong growth in (measured) labour productivity and also in 
multi-factor productivity. This growth was hailed as evidence of the success of 
microeconomic reforms in encouraging Australians to ‘work smarter’ but it was 
equally consistent with working harder. Despite generally weak labour market 
conditions,  real  wages  rose,  again  consistent  with  a  trade-off  along  the  lines 
proposed by employers.
From  about  2000  onwards  these  trends  were  partially  reversed.  The 
increase in average hours of full-time work was halted, and there was evidence 
(again anecdotal) that workers were demanding, and in some cases achieving, 
changes  in  working  conditions  consistent  with  a  more  satisfactory  work-life 
balance. 
It  seems  likely  that  the  shift  away  from  work  intensification  was  due 
primarily to the improvement in labour market conditions, which made workers 
less  fearful  of  losing  their  jobs,  and  more  confident  of  their  ability  to  regain 
employment.
However,  it  is  important  to  note  that  the  effects  of  changing  labour 
market  conditions  are  conditional  on  a  given  set  of  industrial  relations 
conditions. The removal of penalties for unfair dismissal, for example, will make 
it  significantly  easier  for  employers  to  demand  extra  effort  (such  as  work  on 
public holidays) at short notice. While rights not to undertake such work are, as 
the  government’s  advertising  campaign  stressed  ‘Protected  by  Law’,  such 
protections are of little value in a context where employers can dismiss workers 
without any stated cause.19
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It therefore seems probable that the introduction of WorkChoices will lead 
to a renewed push to break down restrictions of all kinds on the personal power 
of employers, including restrictions on working hours, requirements for public 
holidays and restrictions on work practices. Movements in this direction will be 
constrained as long as the labour market remains relatively tight. In the event of 
a recession, however, a radical erosion of existing conditions seems likely. 
Inequality
In  a  comparison  between  neo-liberal  labour  market  institutions  and 
alternatives involving either collective bargaining or centralised wage-fixation, 
one  feature  is  clearly  evident.  Neo-liberal  institutions  produce  substantially 
more unequal outcomes. This is evident both from comparisons over time and 
from comparisons between countries.
The US, where the labour market has always had most of the main neo-
liberal  characteristics,  displays  easily  the  highest  inequality.  The  reforms 
undertaken  in  New  Zealand  and  the  UK  show  up  clearly  in  rising  levels  of 
inequality, overtaking European countries that were initially less egalitarian. 
In the US, declining rates of unionisation and an even more extreme form 
of neo-liberalism have produced a dramatic shift in the distribution of income. 
Low-income  families  have  experienced  very  little  income  growth  since  1970. 
Wages for workers with high school education or less have actually fallen. For 
households whose wage-earners have high school education, the decline in wages 
has been offset by longer hours of work and increased female participation, but 
household  income  has  remained  broadly  stable  (Century  Foundation  2005). 
Meanwhile  earnings  have  risen  dramatically  at  the  top  of  the  income 
distribution  (Autor, Katz and Kearney 2005).
A  number  of  the  reforms  embodied  in  WorkChoices  will  contribute 
directly to increased inequality. The replacement of the AIRC by the Fair Pay 
Commission will almost certainly imply a reduction in minimum wages with a 
flow-on to other award wages at the low end of the pay scale.
However, it seems likely that a range of indirect effects will be even more 20
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significant.  In  the  United  States,  wage  inequality  has  increased  on  many 
different  dimensions.  Not  only  have  premiums  for  education  and  experience 
increased,  but  inequality  within  groups  has  risen.  Equally  importantly,  the 
share of income going to wage workers has declined, while capital income has 
increased  and  payments  to  senior  managers  have  risen  dramatically  (Autor, 
Katz and Kearney 2005).
WorkChoices  will  not  replicate  the  situation  in  the  United  States. 
Nonetheless,  it  seems  reasonable  to  say  that  most  of  the  changes  are  in  the 
direction of a US-style labour market and that the implications for inequality are 
likely to be similar.
Implications for employment
One of the major justifications for labour market reform is the claim that 
it will cause a reduction in unemployment. This claim has three main bases. 
First, there are claims that restrictions on unfair dismissal discourage employers 
from hiring new workers. Second, there is the classical argument that unions 
and the arbitration system set wages above the market-clearing level, leading to 
an  excess  of  supply  over  demand.  Finally,  there  are  general  claims  that 
flexibility will lead to improved economic performance, accompanied by growth 
in employment.
Unemployment and the macro cycle
First, it is necessary to examine the nature of unemployment in Australia 
today.  Considering  the  last  two  decades,  it  is  apparent  that  macroeconomic 
conditions have accounted for most variation in unemployment. 
The  unemployment  rate  fell  to  5.9  per  cent  at  the  end  of  the 
macroeconomic  expansion  of  the  1980s,  when  wages  and  conditions  were 
primarily determined by the highly centralised processes of the Accord between 
the Australian government and the ACTU. The rate rose to 11 per cent as a 
result of contractionary monetary policy motivated primarily by concerns about 
the  growth  of  the  current  account  deficit,  and  about  booming  asset  prices, 
particularly  in  the  Sydney  housing  market.  Although  some  subsequently 21
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discussions  have  made  much  of  the  decline  in  inflation  that  arose  from  the 
recession, this is merely an ex post rationalisation of a policy failure.
Labour  market  institutions  have  changed  radically  since  1990,  but 
without any obvious effect on labour market performance. The centralised wage 
fixation  system  of  the  Accord  was  abandoned  by  the  government  in  1991  in 
favour of enterprise bargaining, with further supporting legislation introduced in 
1992 and 1993, by which time enterprise bargaining had become the dominant 
pattern (Wailes and Lansbury 2000).
The early stages of the recovery followed a fairly standard pattern, with a 
period of ‘jobless growth’ as unused capacity was taken up, being followed by 
fairly strong employment growth in 1994 and a decline in unemployment rates to 
around 8 per cent in 1996. The employment recovery was also influenced by the 
short-lived  Working  Nation   program  introduced  after  the  1993  election,  but 
scaled back in the 1995 Budget. 
The  Howard  government,  elected  in  1996,  scrapped  the  remaining 
Working Nation programs and introduced the Workplace Relations Act. Although 
output growth has been consistently positive throughout the government’s ten 
years in office, reductions in official unemployment have been modest. The ABS 
unemployment rate fell from 8 per cent in 1996 to 6 per cent in 2003 and has 
remained between 5 and 6 per cent since then.
Broader  measures  of  labour  market  employment  tell  a  similar  story, 
suggesting  that  the  performance  of  the  labour  market  in  the  current  cyclical 
peak  is  no  better  than  it  was  in  1989,  and  arguably  worse.  Although  the 
employment/population  ratio  has  risen,  full-time  employment  has  declined, 
particularly  for  males.  Estimates  of  hidden  unemployment  and 
underemployment are generally higher for the current cycle than for that of the 
1980s.
On  the  other  hand,  the  length  of  the  expansion  since  1990  raises  the 
possibility that the macroeconomic cycle has been tamed, and that this is due, at 
least in part, to the greater flexibility of the labour market. Our view, based on 
Australia’s  unsustainably  large  current  account  deficit,  is  that  a  significant 22
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cyclical correction lies ahead. Only when the macroeconomic imbalances have 
been resolved will it be possible to make a clear judgement.
Unfair dismissals
The political heat surrounding the issue of unfair dismissal reflects the 
fact  that  an  employment  contract  contains  many  implicit  terms  and 
commitments. Once both parties have committed to the relationship, each has 
the opportunity to cheat on these commitments. How this works out depends on 
institutional rules, the state of the labour market and similar factors. Whatever 
the  rules  there  are  likely  to  be  numerous  instances  where  employers  or 
employees  feel  that  they  have  been  treated  unfairly.  This  may  lead  to 
withdrawal from the labour force by employees or unwillingness of employers to 
take on new workers.
A priori arguments about the net effect are inconclusive. Supporters of 
unfair dismissals laws make the point that, other things being equal, the easier 
it is to dismiss employees, the higher will be the rate of dismissal, and therefore 
the higher the level of unemployment. Opponents counter that employers will be 
unwilling to take on staff if they are unable to dismiss those who turn out to be 
unsatisfactory.
Freyes and Oslington (2005) assess the impact of unfair dismissal laws by 
considering them as an effective tax on employment, equal to the expected loss 
from unjustified severance payments. Since this loss is small in relation to the 
total wage bill, the implied net employment effect is also small, a net gain of 
around 6000 jobs.
An  alternative,  empirical,  approach  involves  econometric  comparisons 
Initially, the empirical evidence appeared to support relaxation of employment 
protection laws. Lazear (1990) found strong negative correlations between the 
strength of employment protection laws, proxied by severance pay, and desirable 
labour market outcomes, such as employment and participation rates and hours 
worked. However, Lazear’s results have not stood the test of replication with new 
data.  More  recent  research  suggests  employment  protection  laws  lower  the 23
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variance of employment and unemployment but have no clear effect on average 
levels (Bertola et al. 1999, Addison and Teixeira 2003).
Although experience since the introduction of WorkChoices is limited, it 
gives little support to the view that unfair dismissals laws represent a major 
obstacle to hiring. On the standard version of this view, there should exist a 
stock of vacancies, or potential vacancies that employers would be willing to fill 
in  the  absence  of  restrictions.  When  the  law  changes,  employers  should  act 
immediately to fill these vacancies. There is little evidence in employment data 
to support this view.
Some  evidence  on  the  government’s  beliefs  may  be  obtained  from  the 
Budget papers. If WorkChoices was expected to lower the unemployment rate 
consistent with labour market equilibrium, this should be reflected in projections 
of employment and unemployment over the next few years. In fact, however, no 
significant  decline  in  unemployment  is  projected  for  2006-07,  and  projected 
employment  growth in subsequent years is in line with growth in the labour 
force.
Minimum wages and employment
A notable feature of enterprise bargaining has been the fact that wage 
rates obtained under enterprise bargaining and AWAs commonly exceed award 
rates,  though  this  is  offset  by  changes  in  working  conditions.  In  these 
circumstances  there  is  little  reason  to  suppose  that  award  wages  in  general 
exceed the market-clearing level. To the extent that this claim has any validity it 
would be expected to apply only to minimum and near-minimum wages.
The effects of minimum wages on employment in Australia and elsewhere 
have been debated at length and will not be debated here. Dowrick and Quiggin 
(2003) summarise the literature, concluding that effects are likely to be modest, 
while  Lewis  (1997)  presents  a  contrary  view  (see  also  Lewis  and  MacDonald 
2002).
Regardless  of  the  effects  of  minimum  wages  the  complex  interaction 
between  wages,  tax  and  welfare  benefits  means  that  reform  of  the  industrial 24
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relations system in isolation is unlikely to produce socially optimal responses to 
problems of unemployment among low-skilled workers (Wooden 2005). What is 
needed  is  a  comprehensive  response  including  adjustments  to  the  tax-welfare 
system and active labour market policies. One proposal along these lines is that 
of  the  ‘Five  Economists’  (Dawkins  1999).  Regardless  of  the  merits  of  the 
particular policies proposed, it seems clear that the integrated approach is more 
promising than a change in the industrial relations system alone.
General effects on productivity and growth
Available  evidence  on  productivity  yields  notable  counterexamples  to 
claims of a positive correlation between contract-based reform and productivity 
growth. The deregulated and individualised system in New Zealand has a poor 
productivity  record.  Productivity  growth  in  Australia  has  been  unimpressive 
since the Workplace Relations Act came into force in 1997-98.
In  part,  weak  productivity  reflects  the  creation  of  low-wage,  low 
productivity  jobs,  a  pattern  particularly  evident  in  New  Zealand,  but  also 
apparent  in  the  Western  Australian  experiment  with  contracts.  This  may  be 
seen  as  positive  outcome,  the  inverse  of  the  ‘Thatcher  effect’  under  which 
average productivity increased as the least efficient plants were closed down and 
the least productive workers became unemployed. As has a does not seem to be 
much  net  growth  in  employment.  Compared  to  Australia,  New  Zealand  has 
performed consistently poorly on all criteria, as is evidenced by the steady flow of 
migration across the Tasman.
There  are  important  reasons  to  suppose  that  Workchoices  may  have 
negative  effects  on  productivity  in  the  long  run.  As  has  been  shown  above, 
Workchoices will exacerbate the imbalance of power in day to day work life. Yet 
there is much evidence to show that collective decision making and maximising 
employee  autonomy  pays  off  in  both  white  and  blue  collar  workplaces. 
Furthermore, in the long run, entrenched earnings inequality leads to a waste of 
human capital, thereby retarding the skills growth and innovation which provide 
the basis for sustained productivity growth. 25
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Unemployment and power in labour market relations
As has been discussed above, the main effect of the WorkChoices package, 
and of the earlier Workplace Relations Act is not to increase the range of choice 
available  to  employers  and  employees.  Rather,  the  effect  is  to  increase  the 
bargaining  power  of  employers  and  the  range  of  choices  open  to  them,  while 
reducing the range of choices available to employees.
It  would  normally  be  expected  that  such  a  shift  in  bargaining  power 
would lead either to lower wages or to a mixture of wages and conditions that 
leave workers worse off and employers better off. On standard supply-demand 
reasoning, it might be expected that this would lead to an increase in employers’ 
demand  for  labour,  and  therefore  to  a  reduction  in  unemployment.  However, 
there are important reasons why the supply-demand story does not appear to be 
appropriate.
The case of unfair dismissals illustrates the point. It has been argued 
that removing restrictions on unfair dismissal will increasing the willingness of 
employers to hire new staff. On the other hand, by definition, the effect of the 
change is to increase the ease with which employers can dismiss staff. Analyses 
taking account of both effects typically find little net effect on employment.
This point applies more generally to the pattern of changes exhibited in 
WorkChoices.  The  general  effect  is  to  increase  the  monopsony  power  of 
employers,  particularly  in  relation  to  existing  employees,  who  face  significant 
costs in finding new jobs. But this monopsony power can be exercised only via 
the possibility of dismissal and can be effective only if this power is actually 
exercised.
The  same  point  is  true  more  generally.  If  employers  use  monopsony 
power to drive down wages and conditions, employment will be held below the 
socially optimal level.
Where to from here?
The  WorkChoices  reforms  is  part  of  a  general  trend  in  developed 
economies in which unions have generally lost ground, and government action 26
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designed to protect wages and conditions of employment has been wound back. 
Viewed in this light, it may seem to be an inexorable process, which may be 
slowed  from  time  to  time,  but  not  halted  or  reversed.  This  appearance  of 
inevitability is, however, misleading. 
It is worth recalling that from the late 19th century to the 1970s, the 
power and influence of trade unions increased fairly steadily. Seemingly severe 
setbacks, such as the defeat of the strikes of the 1890s turned out in retrospect to 
have  strengthened  the  unions  by  generating  political  responses  such  as  the 
establishment of the Labor Party. By the 1970s (and even earlier) it was the 
apparently untrammelled power of trade unions, and not their weakness, that 
was seen as a political problem by most Australians. As a result of this, and a 
more general shift to neoliberal policies, the trend towards increasingly powerful 
trade unions was reversed.
At least some of the factors that led to the decline of union power are no 
longer applicable. In particular, the balance of public sentiment has changed. 
Fewer people now see trade unions as excessively powerful than have the same 
feeling  about  employers.  More  generally,  the  strong  opposition  to  the 
government’s IR changes, expressed both in protests and in public opinion polls 
is indicative of possible support for a reassertion of social control over labour 
markets, and for a renewed role for unions.
However, it will not be possible simply to turn back the clock. Changes 
such as the increased diversity of the workforce, must be accommodated, and 
this is unlikely to be achieved through highly prescriptive awards. And changes 
in the nature of work, with the decline of the kind of workplace where large 
numbers of workers performed the same or similar tasks implies that old models 
of union organisation are unlikely to be appropriate
An obvious question is whether the centralisation of power that has taken 
place  under  WorkChoices  can  or  should  be  reversed.  Under  the  current 
legislation, this power is to be used almost exclusively against unions. It is easy, 
however, to envisage the same powers being used to impose minimum conditions 
on employers, for example by reducing maximum working hours, or requiring 27
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the provision of parental leave.
Conclusion
WorkChoices   is  commonly  described  in  terms  of  labour  market 
deregulation. This is an odd description of a piece of legislation more than 600 
pages long (with hundreds more pages in supporting material) and replete with 
new offences and penalties. 
WorkChoices will have profound effects on the balance of power between 
employers and employees, and will reshape Australians’ day to day experiences 
of  work.  The  changes  represent  a  shift  from  a  system  designed  around  the 
setting of pay and conditions by an independent body with encouragement for 
collective bargaining to a system where Ministerial and managerial discretion 
are paired with encouragement for individual bargaining. 
The macro effects of WorkChoices are unlikely to be positive either for the 
Australian economy or for Australian society. However, what has been under 
analysed  to  date  is  the  effect  on  the  lived  experience  of  Australians  in  the 
workplace. The combined effect of shifts such as the removal of the Commission 
and  unions  from  grievance  procedures,  empowering  employers  in  bargaining, 
individualisation of the employment relationship and the changes which make 
flexibility  of  working  time  a  matter  of  organisational  priorities  not  employee 
choice will serve to reinforce a less participatory workplace culture. 
WorkChoices   will  reinforce  existing  negative  trends  both  economically 
and socially, while increasing the complexity of the system and shifting power 
from employees further towards employers, and from independent institutions to 
executive discretion.
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